An Alternative Analysis of the Discourse by Descartes, Kant and Hegel in terms of the Ethical Structure of the Kanun by Kazuhiko Yamamoto
317
from taking what is not given, from wrong-doing in sexu-
al passions5. In the fi fth and fourth centuries B.C., 
Socrates and Plato in the Greek world forged the philoso-
phy of dialectic in the form of the Idea of Good in order to 
fi ght the logic of a society without state power, as repre-
sented by Homeric epics1. According to Plato, the ethical 
value system of Homeric epics is alienated from the Idea 
of Good, as it put much emphasis on the emotions, such as 
grief, anger and pleasure, as the foundation of its ethical 
value system instead of reason and the rational elements 
in the soul. He proposed to expel the honeyed music and 
Homeric epics from the polis, which were deemed to be the 
most powerful tool to imbue the ethical value system of a 
society without state power into the souls of the young1,6. 
In the fourth century B.C., Aristotle conversed about 
the political institution of the polis, following Plato’s dis-
course that the ethical value system of Homeric epics was 
alienated from the Idea of Good6. According to Aristotle, 
governments with a regard for the common interest were 
to be constituted in accordance with strict principles of 
justice. In order to achieve justice, i.e., the common inter-
est and a good, through the functioning of the state, he 
The ethical structure of the Albanian customary code, 
the Kanun, is deemed to represent the ethical value sys-
tem of a society without state power1. There will be no 
contradiction to surmise that anatomically modern hu-
mans (Homo sapiens), who are believed to have originated 
in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 years ago, and 
dispersed to Eurasia sometime after 65,000 years ago2–4, 
had lived in a society without state power before state 
power appeared among human society. The ethical struc-
ture of the Kanun is supposed to be the fi rst ethical value 
system that humans have ever had, since it can be safely 
assumed that there was no state power with a viable co-
ercive force which was able to antagonize the ethical value 
system of a society without state power before around 
3000 B.C., when civilizations began to appear5,6. In spite 
of the appearance of civilizations and the resultant advent 
of an incipient state power, humans seemed to have known 
only the ethical value system of a society without state 
power until the fi fth century B.C. when Gotama on the 
Indian continent preached the Eightfold Path such as 
Right Aim, which means attaining the being set on renun-
ciation, on non-resentment and on harmlessness, and 
Right Action, which means abstaining from taking life, 
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claimed that the quality of the ruler in the state was cru-
cial. The ruler ought to have an excellence of character in 
perfection, i.e., reason and the rational elements in the 
soul. One of the most important issues was how to imbue 
the excellence of character into the young through educa-
tion. In regard to this issue, Aristotle expressed his con-
cern about the emotion-inspiring effects the poems, such 
as Homeric epics, exerted on the character of the youth. 
Accordingly, he proposed to reject the professional mode 
of education in music, while he did not propose the expul-
sion of the honeyed music from the polis altogether, ac-
knowledging the healing and purgatorial effects of them 
on the soul6. 
In the fi rst century A.D., Jesus in Galilee preached 
»Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn him 
the other also. Love your enemies, bless them that curse 
you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them 
which despitefully use you, and persecute you« (Matthew 
5.39–44), thus exhorting the cessation of a retributive ac-
tion. Gotama’s and Jesus’ preaching, as well as Plato’s 
Idea of Good, which eventually exhorted people not to take 
revenge themselves, is deemed antithetical to the ethical 
structure of the Kanun, which consists of six concepts: 
»oath«, »honor«, »guest«, »blood«, »food«, and »revenge«1,5. 
However, since these six concepts are related to bodily 
sensations, the emotions and primordial customs, which 
may represent the pristine nature of humans, the ethical 
value system of a society without state power seems, in a 
sense, more pertinent and relevant to the nature of hu-
mans than that of a society with state power, which does 
not accept the retributive action of the offended party as 
a due sanction1,7. 
The basic trait of these religious and philosophical dis-
courses, which try to antagonize the ethical value system 
of a society without state power by eliminating the emo-
tional aspect of humanity from the ethical value system, 
has been inherited by western philosophers such as René 
Descartes (1596–1650), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) through the 
Catholic theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) who 
tried to amalgamate Aristotle’s philosophy with Christi-
anity in the thirteenth century. It is a well-known fact that 
Platonism and Aristotelianism had been revived by Mus-
lin thinkers such as al-Farabi and Averroës (1126–1198) 
in Moorish Spain between the tenth and twelfth centu-
ries8,9. The philosophical discourse of Plato and Aristotle 
seems to have wielded power in western philosophy for 
more than two thousand years, in which it has been the 
general rule that the emotional aspect of humanity is de-
leted as the basis of ethical value system, while reason and 
the rational elements of humanity are valued. Here, a 
question may be raised regarding the mental health of 
humans, who are apparently admonished to incessantly 
lessen the emotional aspect of humanity while honing the 
rational aspect in their everyday way of thinking and be-
havior. Is it good for humans to live with paying attention 
to the rational aspect of humanity while deleting the emo-
tional aspect? Are they happy with living like that? 
In contrast to the ethical value system based chiefl y on 
reason and the rational elements of humanity, the ethical 
structure of the Kanun, which is considered to function 
well in a society without state power, apparently incorpo-
rated sensuous elements, such as pain and agony, and 
emotional aspect, such as anger, fear and sorrow into its 
ethical value system. The logic of the Kanun has the po-
tential to convert these feelings into ethical resentment, 
which may impel the wronged to wield a sacred force 
against the offenders or forgive them. At the same time, 
the ethical structure of the Kanun could bring emotional 
catharsis among the people provoked in the confl ict, and 
therefore may pacify the confl ict through reconciliation1. 
The ethical structure of the Kanun may lead us to discern 
how important and indispensable the sensuous and emo-
tional aspects of humanity are for the life and mental 
health of humans. Since the sensuous and emotional as-
pects may constitute a pretty good portion of humanity, it 
will be hard or almost impossible for humans to live with-
out them. Descartes, Kant and Hegel are the philosophers 
who have exerted a huge amount of infl uence on the way 
of thinking, philosophical consciousness and social sys-
tems of modern society10–14. There have been few studies 
which analyzed their discourse from the viewpoint that 
they might have deleted an important portion of human-
ity. In an attempt to address the issue of humanity in re-
gard to philosophy and ethics, the discourses by Descartes, 
Kant and Hegel were reviewed while paying attention to 
how they dealt with the sensuous and emotional aspects 
of humanity. Through the critical reviewing of their phi-
losophy, the metaphysical implications of the ethical struc-
ture of the Kanun were unearthed. At the same time, a 
hypothesis concerning its origin was presented.
Descartes’ Discourse on Passions, and Cogito, 
Ergo Sum
Descartes fi rst proposed the well-known principle of 
his philosophy, »I think, therefore I am«, in the Discourse 
on the Method. After having published the Discourse on 
the Method in 1637, he seems to have found that he must 
elaborate on the discourse regarding the issues around the 
principle »I think, therefore I am«, in order to make it fi rm 
and understandable. Therefore, Descartes discussed in 
detail the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity 
and the body’s association with them in the Meditations 
on First Philosophy and The Passions of the Soul, which 
were published in 1641 and in 1649, respectively. This 
suggests that it might be appropriate to review his dis-
course from the later one to the earlier than to review it 
chronologically, which is expected to clearly reveal what 
Descartes discussed in his philosophical discourse. There-
fore, this review starts from The Passions of the Soul, 
which was published one year before his death in Sweden.
One of the most important contributions that Des-
cartes made for western philosophy is the fact that he had 
defi nitely introduced the concept of soul-body dualism, and 
thoroughly discussed how the issue of emotions related to 
it. First, Descartes, alleging that what the Ancients 
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taught about the Passions is so little, and for the most part 
so little believable, declares that he will take into consid-
eration a Passion with respect to the subject it happens to, 
and an Action with respect to what makes it happen (Pas-
sions Article 11*). He insists that since no subject acts more 
immediately upon our soul than the body it is jointed to, 
what is a passion in the soul is commonly an action in the 
body (Passions Article 2). Accordingly, Descartes thinks 
that the path for arriving at an understanding of our pas-
sions is to examine the difference between the soul and 
the body in order to understand where each of the func-
tions within us should be attributed (Passions Article 2), 
machinating to shift passions to the side of the body. Des-
cartes asserts both that every kind of thought within hu-
mans belongs to the soul (Passions Article 4) and that 
there remains nothing in us that should be attributed to 
the soul but our thoughts, which are principally of two 
genera: the actions of the soul and passions (Passions Ar-
ticle 17). The actions of the soul are all of our volitions, 
while all the cases of perception or knowledge to be found 
in us can generally be called passions, because it is often 
not our soul that makes them such as they are, and be-
cause it always receives passions from things that are 
represented by them (Passions Articles 17). Claiming that 
the soul has passions within it (Passions Articles 26) and 
the passions of the soul differ from all other thoughts (Pas-
sions Articles 27), Descartes defi nes passions as percep-
tions, sensations or excitations of the soul (Passions Ar-
ticles 27). The passions are numbered among the 
perceptions which the close bond between the soul and the 
body renders confusing and obscure, which may be named 
excitations of the soul (Passions Article 28). Reiterating 
that the actions of the soul are tantamount to volitions, 
that is, the will, and that thoughts other than volitions are 
passions, Descartes asserts the former are absolutely in 
its power and can only indirectly be altered by the body, 
whereas the latter depend absolutely on the actions that 
produce them and can only indirectly be altered by the 
soul (Passions Article 41), though the soul is truly joined 
to the whole body (Passions Article 30). 
In regard to the relationship between the passions and 
the volitions, Descartes claims that our passions cannot 
be directly excited or displaced by the action of our will, 
but they can be indirectly affected by the representation 
of things which are usually joined with the passions we 
will to have and opposed to the ones we will to reject (Pas-
sions Article 45). However, if the passions are vigorous or 
strong, the soul cannot readily alter or check the passions. 
The most the will can do while the excitation is at its full 
strength is not to consent to its effects and to restrain 
many of the movements to which it disposes the body (Pas-
sions Article 46). He criticizes the customary imagination 
of people: all the struggles between the lower part of the 
soul, which is called sensitive, and the higher, which is 
rational, or between the natural appetites and the will. He 
asserts that there is only a single soul in us, and this soul 
has within itself no diversity of parts; the very one that is 
1  Citations of Descartes’ discourse concerning passion here are from The 
Passions of the Soul15, Hackett Publishing Company, 1989.
sensitive is rational, and all its appetites are volitions 
(Passions Article 47). According to Descartes, the error 
which has been committed in having it play different char-
acters, usually opposed to one another, arises only from 
the fact that the soul’s functions have not been rightly 
distinguished from those of the body. He insists that ev-
erything to be found in us that is opposed to our reason 
must be attributed to the body (Passions Article 47). By 
introducing the concept of a little gland in the middle of 
the brain, which is capable of being driven from one side 
by the soul and from the other by the animal spirits, which 
are only bodies (Passions Article 47), he distinguishes 
reason from the body and the animal spirits. Descartes, 
who explains that the animal spirit is composed of the very 
fi ne parts of the blood, which undergo a change in the 
brain to be separated there from the other parts of the 
blood that are not so fi ne (Passions Article 10), elaborates 
on the differences between man and beast, saying »even 
though they (beasts) have no reason and perhaps no 
thought either, all the movements of the spirits and the 
gland that excite the passions in us still exist in them, and 
serve in them to maintain and strengthen, not the pas-
sions as in us, but the nerve and muscle movements that 
usually accompany them« (Passions Article 50).  
Descartes claims that there is only a single soul in us, 
in which a struggle between the passions or the move-
ments of the body that accompany them, and the volitions 
that oppose them may occur (Passions Article 47). He adds 
that those in whom the will can naturally conquer the 
passions most easily and stop the accompanying move-
ments of the body have the strongest souls with fi rm and 
decisive judgments concerning the knowledge of good and 
evil, while the weakest souls of all are those whose will 
does not decide to follow certain judgments, but continu-
ally allows itself to be carried away by present passions 
(Passions Article 48). While there are very few men so 
weak and irresolute that they will nothing but what their 
passion dictates to them, the greater part have decisive 
judgments which they follow in regulating a part of their 
actions (Passions Article 49). However, there is still a 
great difference between resolutions that proceed from 
some false opinion and those that rest on knowledge of the 
truth alone, since we are sure never to have either regret 
or repentance if we follow the latter, whereas we always 
have them upon following the former, when we discover 
the error therein (Passions Article 49). Thus, Descartes 
divides the function of the soul into two parts: the fi rst is 
the actions of the soul, the volition, the will, reason and 
the rational, and the second is the passions associated 
with the movements of the body which accompany them 
and the animal spirits. Though he claims that there is only 
a single soul in us, in which a struggle between the two 
occurs, it is clear that Descartes introduced the body-soul 
dualism into western philosophy in The Passions of the 
Soul, appreciating the value of the volition, the will, rea-
son and the rational, which seem to be associated with the 
actions of the soul as, the foundation of his philosophical 
discourse, while depreciating the value of the passions, the 
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natural appetites and the animal spirits which seem to be 
associated with the body.
 It doesn’t seem too farfetched to surmise that Des-
cartes tried to establish the foundation of his philosophy 
in the Discourse on the Method and the Meditations on 
First Philosophy, bearing the discourse made in The Pas-
sions of the Soul in mind, though the Discourse on the 
Method and the Meditations on First Philosophy were 
published earlier than The Passions of the Soul. Accord-
ingly, Descartes discusses the distinction between the soul 
and the body in the Meditations on First Philosophy, 
which contains a discourse similar to that of The Passions 
of the Soul. In the Meditations on First Philosophy, he fi rst 
tries to fi nd just one thing, however slight, that is certain 
and unshaken by putting aside everything that admits of 
the least doubt (Meditations 242*). After everything has 
been most carefully weighted, he notices that the pro-
nouncement »I am (think), I exist« seems necessarily true 
every time he utters it or conceives it in his mind (Medita-
tions 25). Descartes thinks that he is therefore precisely 
nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, 
or understanding, or reason, truly existing as a thinking 
thing (Meditations 27). In contrast, everything belonging 
to the nature of the body could turn out to be nothing but 
dreams (Meditations 28). Even »sensing«, precisely so 
taken, is nothing other than thinking (Meditations 29). 
He claims that he knows that even bodies are not, prop-
erly speaking, perceived by the senses or by the faculty of 
imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that they are 
not perceived through their being touched or seen, but only 
through their being understood. That is, nothing can be 
perceived more easily and more evidently than one’s own 
mind (Meditations 34). 
As a thing that thinks, one is a thing that doubts, un-
derstands, affi rms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also 
imagines and senses (Meditations 28). Descartes claims 
that the power of imaging that is in him, insofar as it dif-
fers from the power of understanding, is not required for 
his own essence, that is, the essence of his mind. He con-
jectures that, were a body to exist to which a mind is so 
joined that it may apply itself in order to look at the body 
anytime it wishes, it could happen that it is by means of 
this very body that he imagines corporeal things. The 
mind, when it understands, in a sense turns toward itself 
and looks at one of the ideas that are in it, whereas when 
it imagines, it turns toward the body, and intuits in the 
body something that conforms to an idea either under-
stood by the mind or perceived by sense (Meditations 73). 
In regard to sense, Descartes says that he senses that his 
body is found among many other bodies, by which his body 
can be affected in various benefi cial or harmful ways 
(Meditations 74). When Descartes gauges what is oppor-
tune by means of a certain sensation of pleasure and what 
is inopportune by a sensation of pain, and when he senses 
within him hunger, thirst, and appetites as well as certain 
bodily tendencies toward mirth, sadness, anger and other 
2  Citations of Descartes’ discourse here are from Discourse on Method 
and Meditations on First Philosophy16, Hackett Publishing Company, 
1998.
affects, he notices that it is not without reason that he 
thought that he sensed things that were manifestly differ-
ent from his thought, namely, the bodies from which these 
ideas proceeded (Meditations 74, 75). Concerning the 
questions of why a certain sadness of spirit should arise 
from some sensation or other of pain, and why a certain 
elation should arise from a sensation of excitement, or why 
that particular twitching in the stomach, which he calls 
hunger, should warn him to have something to eat, or why 
dryness in the throat should warn him to take something 
to drink, Descartes has no explanation other than that he 
has been taught this way by nature (Meditations 76). 
Though nature seems to have taught him everything else 
as well that he judges concerning the objects of the senses, 
he determines in countless other such instances that judg-
ments in matters of the external senses as well as the 
internal senses are in error (Meditations 76, 77), because 
the senses would naturally be deceived (Meditations 88). 
Since he does not think that what he was taught by nature 
deserves much credence because he seems driven by na-
ture toward many things about which reason tries to dis-
suade him, he is of the opinion that he must not rashly 
admit everything that he derives from the sense (Medita-
tions 77, 78). He has a body that is very closely joined to 
him. Nevertheless, because on the one hand he has a clear 
and distinct idea of himself, insofar as he is merely a 
thinking thing and not an extended thing, and because on 
the other hand he has a distinct idea of a body, insofar as 
it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, 
he concludes that he is really distinct from his body, and 
can exist without it (Meditations 78). There is a great dif-
ference between a mind and a body in that a body, by its 
very nature, is always divisible, and that on the other 
hand, the mind is utterly indivisible (Meditations 85, 86). 
Thus, Descartes explicitly declares that the nature of man 
is composed of mind and body (Meditations 88), appreciat-
ing the value of thinking, the mind and reason as the 
foundations of his philosophical discourse while depreciat-
ing the value of the body and senses in the Meditations on 
First Philosophy.
In the Discourse on the Method, Descartes seeks the 
fi rst principle of his philosophy, which he can accept with-
out scruple. He tries to attain the fi rst principle by reject-
ing as absolutely false everything in which he can imagine 
the least doubt (Discourse 31, 32). Descartes resolves to 
pretend that all the things that have ever entered his mind 
are no truer than the illusions of his dreams. Then, he 
notices that while he wants to think that everything is 
false, it necessarily has to be the case that he, who is 
thinking this, is something. Finding that »I think, there-
fore I am« is so fi rm and so assured that all the most ex-
travagant suppositions of the skeptics are incapable of 
shaking it, he accepts it without scruple as the fi rst prin-
ciple of his philosophy (Discourse 32). Claiming that he is 
a substance the whole essence or nature of which is simply 
to think, and which, in order to exist, has no need of any 
place nor depends on any material thing, Descartes de-
clares that this »I«, that is to say, the soul through which 
one is what he is, is entirely distinct from the body (Dis-
course 33). His refl ection upon the fact that he doubts and 
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that, as a consequence, his being is not utterly perfect, 
compels him to search for the source from which he has 
learned to think of something that is more perfect than 
himself. He postulates that the source has to be from some 
nature that is in fact more perfect than his own self be-
cause it is a manifest contradiction for him to receive the 
idea from nothing, and because it is a contradiction that 
something more perfect should follow from and depend 
upon something less perfect (Discourse 34). Since it is an 
obvious fact that something should not come from nothing, 
and Descartes cannot obtain it from himself, this idea that 
has within itself all the perfections, should have been 
placed in him by a nature truly more perfect than his own. 
Descartes regards it to be God (Discourse 34). Further-
more, he postulates that none of those ideas which indicate 
any imperfection are in God. Therefore, doubt, inconstan-
cy, sadness, and the like can not be in God. Descartes 
claims that though he has ideas of a number of sensible 
and corporeal things, he recognizes intelligent nature as 
distinct from corporeal nature, in which its composition 
attests to dependence. Since dependence is manifestly a 
defect, and being composed of these two natures would be 
a contradiction in God, God is not thus composed (Dis-
course 35), which indicates that God is not composed of a 
corporeal nature, but only of an intelligent nature. Since 
God is a perfect being from which all that is in us comes 
from, the things we very clearly and very distinctly con-
ceive are assured to be all true for the reason that God is 
or exists (Discourse 38). All our ideas or notions must have 
some foundation of truth, for it would not be possible that 
God, who is all-perfect and all-truthful, would have put 
them in us without truth (Discourse 40). As God is sup-
posed to have created a rational soul and joined it to the 
body in a particular manner (Discourse 46), we should 
never allow ourselves to be persuaded except by the evi-
dence of our reason, whether awake or asleep (Discourse 
39). Accordingly, Descartes decides to spend his whole life 
cultivating his reason and advancing, as far as he can, in 
the knowledge of the truth, following the method he has 
prescribed, himself (Discourse 27). The principle he adopts 
in his attempt at governing his moral conduct by means 
of reason is that when he assures himself of the maxims 
and puts them to one side along with the truths of the 
faith, he can freely undertake to rid himself of the rest of 
his opinions (Discourse 28). Descartes felt so assured of 
his method that he bragged his sagacity, saying “if there 
is any task in the world that could not be accomplished so 
well by anyone else but the same person who began it, it 
is the one which I am working” (Discourse 72). 
Kant’s Critique of Reason, and Ethics
In the eighteenth century, Kant made an utmost effort 
to search for the foundation of morality in his master-
pieces such as the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the Cri-
tique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique of Judg-
ment (1790), following Descartes’ penetrating insights, 
such as cogito, ergo sum. Kant made critical remarks on 
the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, which seem to have enabled him to come across 
rational psychology, which could serve not only to reveal 
such properties that do not belong to possible experience 
at all, but also to teach apodictically about thinking be-
ings, in general, touching on their nature (Pure Reason 
A347, B4063*). Kant, who criticized Descartes’ logic as a 
species of the psychology of inner sense which would ex-
plain the appearances of inner sense, in other words, a 
merely transcendental use of the understanding which 
excludes every admixture of experience, launched to real-
ize the proposition I think, which, if taken problemati-
cally, seems to contain the form of every judgment of un-
derstanding whatsoever and accompanies all categories 
as their vehicle, with a critical eye through all the predica-
tions of the pure doctrine of the soul (Pure Reason A347, 
B406, A348). According to Kant, those whose existence 
can be inferred only as a cause of a given perception have 
only a doubtful existence, for the existence of a real object 
outside one’s mind is never given directly in perception, 
but can only be added in thought to what is a modifi cation 
of one’s inner sense as its external cause, and hence can 
only be inferred (Pure Reason A367). All outer appear-
ances are of this kind, as their existence cannot be im-
mediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause 
of given perceptions (Pure Reason A367). Since it is clear 
that we cannot encounter the external that is not in us in 
our apperception, Descartes rightly limited all perception 
in the narrowest sense to the proposition of »I (as a think-
ing being) am« (Pure Reason A367, A368). 
The Descartes’ »I think«, deemed to be an empirical 
proposition, contains within itself the proposition »I exist«. 
However, we cannot say »Everything that thinks, exists«, 
for then the property of thinking would make all beings 
possessing it into necessary being. Since it is apparent 
that the major premise, »Everything that thinks, exists« 
cannot be tenable, our existence cannot be regarded as 
inferred from the proposition »I think«, as Descartes held 
(Pure Reason B422). The unity of consciousness, which 
grounds the categories, is here taken for an intuition of 
the subject as an object, and the category of substance is 
applied to it. But this unity is only the unity of thinking, 
through which no object is given. Thus the category of 
substance, which always presupposes a given intuition, 
cannot be applied to it, and hence this subject cannot be 
cognized at all (Pure Reason B421, B 422). Cogito, ergo 
sum is deemed to express an indeterminate empirical in-
tuition, i.e., a perception, preceding the experience that is 
to determine the object of perception through the category 
in regard to time (Pure Reason B422, B423). Here, exis-
tence is not yet a category, which is not related to an inde-
terminately given object, but rather to an object of which 
one has a concept, and about which one wants to know 
whether or not it is posited outside the concept (Pure Rea-
son B423). While the proposition »I think« is an empirical 
proposition, it does not mean that the »I« in this proposi-
tion is an empirical representation. Kant thinks that the 
»I« in the proposition is rather purely intellectual, because 
3  Citations of Kant’s discourse here are from Critique of Pure Reason17, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
322
K. Yamamoto: Emotion, Ethics and Philosophy, Coll. Antropol. 39 (2015) 2: 317–334
it seems to belong to thinking in general (Pure Reason 
B423). However, since the act »I think« would not take 
place without any empirical representation, which pro-
vides the material for thinking, the empirical is deemed 
to be only the condition of the application, or use, of pure 
intellectual faculty (Pure Reason B423). Then, Kant no-
tices that an indeterminate perception in cogito, ergo sum 
signifi es only something real, which is given, and indeed 
only to thinking in general, thus not as appearance, and 
also not as a thing in itself, but rather as something that 
in fact exists and is indicated as an existing thing in the 
proposition »I think« (Pure Reason B423). This seems to 
be the starting point of Kant’s philosophical exploration. 
Here, the question of whether or not any truth exists 
with the forming of the empirical representation in Des-
cartes’ proposition »I«, arises. Descartes raised the ques-
tion himself, saying »…having noticed that there is noth-
ing at all in this I think, therefore I am that assures me 
that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clear-
ly that, in order to think, it is necessary to exist«, and 
began to search for “what is needed for a proposition to be 
true and certain« (Discourse 33). Then, Descartes came 
across what was needed for the proposition to be true and 
certain, i.e., God. While Descartes desperately needed 
God in order to give substance to cogito, ergo sum, Kant 
criticized it, saying »the concept of an absolutely necessary 
being is a pure concept of reason, i.e., a mere idea, the 
objective reality of which is far from being proved by the 
fact that reason needs it,… « (Pure Reason A592/B620). 
Kant claims to have found that the illusion consisting in 
the confusion of a logical predicate with a real one nearly 
precludes all instruction. In a logical predicate, even the 
subject can be predicated of itself, for logic can be abstract-
ed from all content (Pure Reason A598/B626). Since the 
determination is a predicate which goes beyond the con-
cept of the subject and enlarges it, it must not be included 
in the subject already. Being is obviously not a real predi-
cate, i.e., a concept of something that could add to the 
concept of a thing, but merely the positing of a thing or of 
certain determinations in themselves (Pure Reason A598/
B626). According to Kant, though the proposition »God is 
omnipotent« contains two concepts that have their object, 
i.e., God and omnipotence, the little word »is” is not a 
predicate in it, but only that which posits the predicate in 
relation to the subject (Pure Reason A598/B626, A599/
B627). When we think of this object (God) as given abso-
lutely (through the expression, »it is«), nothing is added to 
the concept, which expresses merely its possibility, where 
the actual contains nothing more than the merely possible 
(Pure Reason A599/B627). Even if nothing at all is miss-
ing in our concept of the possible real content of a thing in 
general, something is still missing in relation to our entire 
state of thinking, namely that the cognition of this object 
should also be possible a posteriori. On the contrary, if we 
try to think existence through the pure category alone, 
then it is no wonder that we cannot assign any mark dis-
tinguishing it from mere possibility (Pure Reason A600/
B628, A601/B629). Kant tries to overcome this conun-
drum by proposing the idea that every existential proposi-
tion is synthetic, i.e., with actuality, the object is not 
merely included in our concept analytically, but adds syn-
thetically to our concept (Pure Reason A598/B626, A599/
B627). According to Kant, whatever and however much 
our concept of an object may contain, we have to go out 
beyond it in order to provide it with existence. While with 
objects of sense, this happens through the connection with 
some perception of ours in accordance with empirical laws, 
for objects of pure thinking there is no means whatsoever 
for cognizing their existence, because it would have to be 
cognized entirely a priori (Pure Reason A601/B629). If we 
succeed in cognizing a priori the existence of the object of 
pure thinking such as God, cogito, ergo sum may be re-
garded as signifying something that in fact exists, and is 
indicated as an existing thing in the proposition »I think« 
(Pure Reason B423). Kant, who excoriated the ontological 
(Cartesian) proof of the existence of a highest being from 
concepts, with his saying »a human being can no more 
become richer in insight from mere ideas than a merchant 
could in resources if he wanted to improve his fi nancial 
state by adding a few zeros to his cash balance«, concludes 
that it is only so much trouble and labor lost (Pure Reason 
A602/B630). There has been an urgent need for Kant to 
fi nd how human cognition, independent of all experience 
and even of all impressions of the senses, is possible (Pure 
Reason B2), because he seems to have keenly realized that 
this cognition should be closely linked with the general 
and pure logic that constitutes the pure doctrine of reason 
with no empirical principles (Pure Reason B78, A54). Pure 
logic in which everything must be completely a priori is a 
proven doctrine, while applied logic is a representation of 
the understanding and the rules of its necessary use in 
concreto. Kant thinks that general and pure logic is re-
lated to applied logic as pure morality, which contains 
merely necessary moral laws of free will in general. It is 
also related to the doctrine of virtue proper, which as-
sesses these laws under the hindrances of feelings, incli-
nations, and the passions to which human beings are more 
or less subject, and which can never yield a true and prov-
en science, since it requires empirical and psychological 
principles just as much as applied logic does (Pure Reason 
A54, B79, A55). 
Is it possible to have a general and pure logic, which is 
supposed to be the basis of Kant’s morality? How did he 
try to formulate it? According to Kant, in all judgments in 
which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought, 
this relation is possible only in two different ways: either 
the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that 
is (covertly) contained in this concept A, or B lies entirely 
outside concept A, though to be sure it stands in connec-
tion with it. The fi rst case is called the judgment »ana-
lytic«, and the second is »synthetic«. The analytic judg-
ments seem to be the judgments of clarifi cation since 
through the predicate, these do not add anything to the 
concept of the subject, but only break it up by means of 
analysis into its component concepts, which were already 
a part of the concept, while the synthetic judgments seem 
to be the judgments of amplifi cation since they add a pred-
icate to the concept of the subject, which was not a part of 
the original concept at all, and could not have been ex-
tracted from it through analysis (Pure Reason B10, A7, 
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B11). In the expectation that there can perhaps be con-
cepts that may be related to objects a priori, not as pure 
or sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure 
thinking, that are thus concepts neither of empirical nor 
aesthetic origin, Kant provisionally formulates the idea of 
transcendental logic, which is a science of pure under-
standing and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of 
which one thinks objects completely a priori (Pure Reason 
A57). Does it contain truth? Kant, nominally defi ning 
truth as the agreement of cognition with its object, still 
has a problem in regard to the merely logical criterion of 
truth, which suggests that the agreement of a cognition 
with the general and formal laws of understanding and 
reason, is certainly the conditio sine qua non and thus the 
negative condition of all truth. The error that concerns not 
form but content cannot be discovered by any touchstone 
of logic (Pure Reason A58, B84, A60). But since the mere 
form of cognition, however well it may agree with logical 
laws, is far from suffi cing to constitute the material (objec-
tive) truth of the cognition, nobody can dare to judge ob-
jects or to assert anything about them with more logic and 
without having drawn on antecedently well-founded infor-
mation about them outside of logic in order, subsequently, 
merely to investigate its use and connection in a coherent 
whole according to logical laws, or, better, solely to exam-
ine them according to such laws. Nevertheless, there is 
something so seductive in the possession of an apparent 
art for giving all of our cognitions the form of understand-
ing, even though, with regard to their content, one may 
yet be very empty and poor, that humans are tempted to 
use a general logic, which is merely a canon for judging, 
as if it were an organon. As a putative organon, Kant calls 
the general logic »dialectic«. (Pure Reason B85, A61, B86). 
In order to befi t the dignity of philosophy, »dialectic« may 
be designated as a critique of dialectical illusion, which is 
counted as part of logic (Pure Reason A62). It may be in-
ferred from the actual use of dialectic that it was nothing 
other than the logic of illusion – a sophistical art for giving 
to ignorance, indeed even to intentional tricks, the air of 
truth, by imitating the method of thoroughness, which 
logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for the 
embellishment of every empty pretension (Pure Reason 
A61, B86). It seems tantamount to nothing but idle chat-
ter, asserting or impeaching whatever one wants to speak 
about with some plausibility (Pure Reason B86, A 62). 
According to Kant, in a transcendental logic, we isolate 
the understanding and elevate from our cognition only the 
part of our thought that has its origin solely in the under-
standing. The use of this pure cognition depends on this 
as its condition: that objects are given to us in intuition, 
to which it can be applied. For without intuition, all of our 
cognition would lack objects, and therefore remain com-
pletely empty. Kant insists that the part of transcendental 
logic that expounds the elements of the pure cognition of 
the understanding and the principles without which no 
object can be thought of at all, constitutes the transcen-
dental analytic, a logic of truth, for no cognition can con-
tradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e., 
all relation to any object, hence all truth (Pure Reason 
B87, A63). Also, the part of transcendental logic which 
uses pure understanding for synthetically judging, assert-
ing, and deciding about objects which are not given to us, 
is called transcendental dialectic, which is a critique of the 
understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysi-
cal use (Pure Reason B88). Kant seems to have expected 
that the transcendental dialectic may show us the way to 
reach the unknown = X on which the understanding de-
pends when it believes itself to have discovered a predicate 
beyond the concept of A, that is foreign to it, yet which it 
nevertheless believes to be connected with it (Pure Reason 
A9, B13). Why does Kant have to formulate such an ap-
parently enigmatic, odd, and equivocal procedure as the 
transcendental dialectic in order to search for his own 
»truth«? Kant answers himself, saying »although the su-
preme principles of morality and the fundamental con-
cepts of it are a priori cognitions, they still do not belong 
in transcendental philosophy, for, while they do not, to be 
sure, take the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of 
desires and inclinations, etc., which are all of empirical 
origin, as the ground of their precepts, they still must 
necessarily include them in the composition of the system 
of pure morality in the concept of duty, as the hindrance 
that must be overcome or the attraction that ought not to 
be made into motive« (Pure Reason A14, A15, B29). 
Thus, it becomes clear that the momentum of Kant’s 
philosophical discourse is directed toward formulating or 
fi nding the foundation of his pure morality through the 
critique of pure reason, to which everything that consti-
tutes transcendental philosophy belongs. His discourse 
goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the com-
plete estimation of synthetic a priori cognition (Pure Rea-
son A14/B28), which seems tantamount to the transcen-
dental dialectic. According to Kant, while performing 
actions from immediate inclination or in conformity with 
duty does not have moral content, performing actions from 
duty does (Groundwork 4:397-3984*). Action from duty has 
moral worth if it is performed, merely depending upon the 
principle of volition in accordance with which the action is 
performed without regard for any object of the faculty of 
desire (Groundwork 4:399–400). The moral worth of the 
principle of volition lies in the principle of the will, which 
stands between its a priori principle, which is formal, and 
it’s a posteriori incentive, which is material, as at a cross-
roads. It must be determined by the formal principle of 
volition as such when an action is done from duty, where 
every material principle has been withdrawn from it 
(Groundwork 4:400). Since an action from duty is to en-
tirely put aside the infl uence of inclination and with it 
every object of the will, there is left for the will nothing 
that could determine it except objectively the law and sub-
jectively pure respect for this practical law. Therefore, the 
maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes 
upon all our inclinations, is the will of a rational being, in 
which the highest and unconditional good alone can be 
found (Groundwork 4:400-401). The representation of the 
law can occur only in a rational being. If the will is de-
4  Citations of Kant’s discourse concerning morals here are from »Ground-
work of the Metaphysics of Morals« in Practical Philosophy18, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996.
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prived of every impulse that could arise from obeying some 
law, nothing would be left but the conformity of actions, as 
such, with universal law: that is, »I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim 
should become a universal law« (Groundwork 4:402). Only 
a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with 
the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with 
principles, or as a will. The will is a capacity to choose only 
that which reason, independently from inclination, cog-
nizes as practically necessary, that is, as good. The repre-
sentation of an objective principle, insofar as it is neces-
sitating for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the 
formula of the command is called an »imperative« (Ground-
work 4:412-413). There is one imperative that, without 
being based upon and having as its condition any other 
purpose to be attained by certain conduct, commands this 
conduct immediately, which is the »categorical impera-
tive« (Groundwork 4:416). Kant asserts that a moral im-
perative, which appears to be categorical and uncondi-
tional, would in fact be only a pragmatic precept that 
makes us attentive to our advantages and teaches us to 
take only these into consideration (Groundwork 4:419). 
Who can prove by experience the nonexistence of a cause, 
such as the moral imperative, when all that experience 
teaches is that we do not perceive it? Kant answers himself 
again by saying »we shall thus have to investigate en-
tirely a priori the possibility of a categorical imperative« 
(Groundwork 4:419-420). The categorical imperative is 
tantamount to the principle of autonomy: to choose only 
in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also in-
cluded as universal law in the same volition. However, that 
the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to it 
as a condition cannot be proved by mere analysis of the 
concepts to be found in it, because it is a synthetic proposi-
tion. This means that one would have to go beyond cogni-
tion of objects to a critique of the subject, that is, of pure 
practical reason, since this synthetic proposition, which 
commands apodictically, must be capable of being cog-
nized completely a priori (Groundwork 4:440). According 
to Kant, will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar 
as they are rational, and freedom would be that property 
of such causality that it could be effi cient independently of 
alien causes determining it (Groundwork 4:446). The 
proposition that the will is, in all of its actions, a law for 
itself, indicates only the »principle« to act, on no other 
maxim than that which can also have itself as an object 
in its universal law. This is precisely the formula of the 
categorical imperative and is the principle of morality; 
hence, a free will and a will under moral laws are one and 
the same (Groundwork 4:447). Kant thinks that a rational 
being counts one’s self, as intelligent, as belonging to the 
world of understanding, and only as an effi cient cause be-
longing to this does he call his causality a will. On the 
other side one is also conscious of one’s self as a part of the 
world of sense (Groundwork 4:453). Kant tries to fi nd an 
answer to the diffi cult question of how the categorical im-
perative is possible among humans who are both rational 
beings in intelligence and beings conscious of themselves 
as a part of the world of sense as follows: »that the idea of 
freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world and 
consequently, if I were only this, all my actions would al-
ways be in conformity with the autonomy of the will; but 
since at the same time I intuit myself as a member of the 
world of sense, they ought to be in conformity with it; and 
this categorical ought represents a synthetic proposition 
a priori, since to my will affected by sensible desires there 
is added the idea of the same will but belonging to the 
world of the understanding – a will pure and practical of 
itself, which contains the supreme condition, in accor-
dance with reason, of the former will« (Groundwork 4:454). 
According to Kant, the idea of freedom seems inseparably 
combined with the concept of autonomy, as does the uni-
versal principle of morality (Groundwork 4:452-453). 
Here, there is a huge obstacle, which looks almost impos-
sible to get over: the incentive must be quite lacking; for 
this idea of an intelligible world would itself have to be the 
incentive, or that in which reason originally takes an in-
terest; however to make this comprehensible is precisely 
the problem that we cannot solve (Groundwork 4:462). In 
the end, Kant comes to the conclusion that human reason 
cannot make comprehensible, as regards its absolute ne-
cessity, an unconditional practical law (such as the cate-
gorical imperative must be); for, that it is unwilling to do 
this through a condition – namely by means of some inter-
est laid down as a basis – cannot be held against it, since 
then it would not be the moral law, that is, the supreme 
law of freedom, and we can comprehend only its incompre-
hensibility (Groundwork 4:463).
Hegel’s Logic
The contradiction between autonomy of the will and 
freedom of the will led Kant to the conclusion that human 
reason could not make comprehensible, as regards its ab-
solute necessity, an unconditional practical law, such as 
the categorical imperative must be (Groundwork 4:461-
463). Kant elaborated on this aporia, stating »it is quite 
beyond the capacity of any human reason to explain how 
pure reason, without other incentives that might be taken 
from elsewhere, can be of itself practical, that is, how the 
mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims 
as laws (which would admittedly be the form of a pure 
practical reason), without any matter (object) of the will 
in which one could take some interest in advance, can of 
itself furnish an incentive and produce an interest that 
would be called purely moral; it is impossible for us to 
explain…« (Groundwork 4:461). Hegel tried to overcome 
this aporia with his own original idea. He claims the fact 
that Critical Philosophy holds on to the factum that uni-
versality and necessity, being essential determinations, 
are found to be present in what is called experience, led 
Kant to think that because this element does not stem 
from the empirical as such, it should belong to the sponta-
neity of thinking, or, be a priori (Encyclopaedia Logic 
§405*). Accordingly, Kant adopted the transcendental dia-
lectic as the grounds of his philosophy, which expounds 
5  Citations of Hegel’ discourse here are from The Encyclopaedia Logic19, 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1991.
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the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding 
and the principles without which no object could be 
thought at all (Pure Reason B87), which is tantamount to 
the proposition of the synthetic a priori cognition (judg-
ment). Why does Kantian philosophy need this appar-
ently enigmatic proposition? Hegel believes that when 
Critical Philosophy subjects to investigation the validity 
of the concepts of the understanding or the thought-deter-
minations, it does not deal with the determinate mutual 
relationship of these thought-determinations between 
each other. Critical Philosophy examines these thought-
determinations according to the antithesis of subjectivity 
and objectivity, which relates to the distinction of the ele-
ments within experience. In this context, »objectivity« 
refers to the elements of universality and necessity, i.e., of 
thought-determinations themselves – the so-called a pri-
ori. Critical Philosophy extends the antithesis in such a 
way that experience in its entirety falls within subjectiv-
ity; i.e., both of these elements together are subjective, and 
nothing remains in contrast with subjectivity except the 
thing-in-itself (Encyclopaedia Logic §41). Here, thoughts, 
although they are universal and necessary determina-
tions, are still only our thoughts, and are cut off from what 
the thing is in-itself by an impassable gulf (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §41 addition 2). Since the true objectivity of thinking 
may consist in this: that thoughts are not merely our 
thoughts, but, at the same time the In-itself of things and 
of whatever else is objective (Encyclopaedia Logic §41 ad-
dition 2), Critical Philosophy, which contains momentum, 
explicitly directs toward fi nding the foundation of moral-
ity, desperately needs the spontaneity of thinking or the 
synthetic a priori cognition (judgment) as a presupposed 
fact in order to pass the impassable gulf between subjec-
tive cognition associated with experience and the thing-
in-itself. 
Therefore, the fi rst task for Kantian philosophy is to 
investigate how far the forms of thinking are capable of 
helping us reach the cognition of truth, probing their own 
limits and their own defects. In other words, the faculty 
of cognition is to be investigated before cognition begins. 
There soon creeps in the mistaken project of wanting to 
have cognition before we have any cognition, or of not 
wanting to go into water before we have learned to swim 
(Encyclopaedia Logic §41 addition 1). Kant seems to think 
that the original identity of the »I« within thinking (the 
transcendental unity of self-consciousness) is the determi-
nate ground of the concept of understanding, which means 
that the thought-determinations have their source in the 
Ego, which furnishes the determinations of universality 
and necessity. In Critical Philosophy, the representations 
that are given through feeling and intuition are manifold 
with regard to their content, and they are equally mani-
fold through their form, i.e., through the mutual external-
ity of sensibility in its two forms, space and time. They are 
as forms of intuiting (as what is universal in it) a priori, 
called the transcendental aesthetic by Kant. Since the »I« 
relates this manifold of sense-experience and intuiting to 
itself and unites it inwardly as within One consciousness 
(pure apperception), this manifold is brought into an iden-
tity, into an original combination. The determinate modes 
of this relating are the pure concepts of the understanding, 
or the categories (Encyclopaedia Logic §42). The catego-
ries that elevate mere perception into objectivity, into ex-
perience, are the unities merely of subjective conscious-
ness, i.e., the concepts conditioned by the given material. 
The categories, which are empty on their own account, 
have their application and use only in experience, whose 
other component, the determinations of feeling and intu-
ition, is equally something subjective (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §43). Therefore, the categories seem unfi t to be the 
determinations of the Absolute which is not given in per-
ception, suggesting that the understanding, or cognition 
through the categories cannot become cognizant of things-
in-themselves (Encyclopaedia Logic §44). The faculty that 
sees what is conditioned in all of this empirical awareness 
of things is reason, which is the faculty of the uncondi-
tioned. The unconditioned or infi nite, which seems to be 
the object of reason, is nothing but the self-equivalent, 
original identity of the »I« in thinking, the abstract »I« 
itself. Our empirical cognitions are not appropriate for this 
identity that lacks determinations altogether (Encyclopae-
dia Logic §45). However, the need arises to be cognizant 
of this identity or of the empty thing-in-itself, which means 
nothing else but the knowing of an object according to its 
determinate content. Since the Kantian reason has noth-
ing but the categories for its determination of the thing-
in-itself, or of the infi nite, the reason, which wants to use 
the categories for the purpose of being cognizant of the 
thing-in-itself or of the infi nite, fl ies off and becomes »tran-
scendent« (Encyclopaedia Logic §46), reaching the place 
of proposing the synthetic a priori cognition. According to 
Hegel, this is the fi rst side of the critique of reason which 
is only a subjective idealism, one which has nothing to do 
with the content, and has before it only the abstract forms 
of subjectivity and objectivity; on top of that, it sticks one-
sidedly with the former, i.e., subjectivity, as the ultimate, 
and thoroughly affi rmative, determination. On account 
that in the Kantian philosophy the categories have their 
source in the unity of self-consciousness, Hegel criticizes 
it, saying that, in fact, cognition through the categories 
contains nothing objective, and that the objectivity that is 
ascribed to them is itself only something subjective (En-
cyclopaedia Logic §46). 
According to Hegel, the application of the categories by 
reason in the cognition of its objects is the second side of 
the critique of reason, in which the content of the catego-
ries becomes a topic of discussion, at least with regard to 
some of their determinations (Encyclopaedia Logic §46). 
Hegel is interested in how Kant judged the application of 
the categories to the Unconditioned. The fi rst uncondi-
tioned that Kant considers is the soul. The empirical de-
terminations are: »in my consciousness I always fi nd my-
self (1) as the determining subject, (2) as a singular or as 
something abstractly simple, (3) as what is One and the 
same in everything manifold of which I am conscious – as 
something-identical, (4) as something that distinguishes 
me as thinking from everything outside me« (Encyclopae-
dia Logic §47). In the procedure of the traditional meta-
physics, the corresponding categories, or thought-determi-
nations are set, which give rise to four propositions: (1) the 
soul is a substance; (2) it is a simple substance; (3) it is 
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numerically identical with respect to the various times of 
its being-there; (4) it stands in relationship to what is spe-
cial. Kant, who draws attention to the fl aw involved in this 
transition, indicates that since two types of determina-
tions are confounded (paralogism), namely, empirical de-
terminations with categories, concluding from the former 
to the latter, or replacing the fi rst with the second, is un-
justifi ed (Encyclopaedia Logic §47). Hegel asserts that 
Kant’s criticism expresses nothing other than the com-
ment of Hume, which indicates that thought-determina-
tions in general – universality and necessity – are not 
found in perception, and that, both in its content and in 
its form, the empirical is diverse from the determination 
of thought (Encyclopaedia Logic §47). If thought and ap-
pearance do not completely correspond with each other, 
we have a choice, initially, as to which of them to regard 
as the defi cient one. Hegel criticizes Kant’s idealism by 
saying that so far as the idealism concerns the rational, 
the defect is shifted onto the thoughts; thoughts are found 
to be unsatisfactory because they do not match up with 
what is perceived (Encyclopaedia Logic §47). 
The next discourse of Kantian philosophy, which Hegel 
tries to criticize, is the issue of antinomy. When reason 
attempts to be cognizant of the unconditioned in the world, 
it gets involved in antinomies, i.e., in the assertion of two 
opposed propositions about the same object. Since each of 
the propositions must be affi rmed with equal necessity, 
what follows from this is that content of this »world«, 
whose determinations give rise to contradictions of this 
sort, cannot be in-itself, but can only be appearance. 
Kant’s solution to this issue, i.e., that contents themselves, 
namely, the categories, on their own account, bring about 
the contradiction, is that the contradiction does not lie in 
the object in and for itself, but is only attributable to rea-
son and to its cognition of the object (Encyclopaedia Logic 
§48). Hegel claims that the solution, which consists mere-
ly in a tenderness for the things of this world, is as trivial 
as the viewpoint is profound. Accordingly, Kant’s solution 
implies that the stain of contradiction ought not to be in 
the essence of what is in the world while it has to belong 
only to thinking reason, to the essence of the spirit. It is 
not considered at all objectionable that the world as it ap-
pears shows contradiction to the spirit that observes it 
since the way the world is for a subjective spirit, for sensi-
bility, and for the understanding, is the world as it ap-
pears. However, when the essence of what is in the world 
is compared to the essence of spirit, it surprises Hegel to 
see how naively the humble affi rmation that what is in-
wardly contradictory is not the essence of the world, but 
belongs to reason, the thinking essence, has been ad-
vanced and repeated (Encyclopaedia Logic §48). In the 
perspective of the older metaphysics, it was assumed that, 
where cognition fell into contradictions, it was just an ac-
cidental aberration and rested on subjective errors in in-
ferring and arguing. Kant asserts that it lies in the very 
nature of thinking to lapse into contradictions (»antino-
mies«) when it aims at cognition of the infi nite (Encyclo-
paedia Logic §48 addition). It seems tantamount to saying 
that reason only falls into contradiction through the ap-
plication of the categories. In order to rescue reason from 
being ultimately reduced to an empty identity, Kant frees 
it from contradiction through the easy sacrifi ce of all im-
port and content by simply subsuming the determinations 
of an object under a ready-made schema, instead of deduc-
ing them from the Concept (Encyclopaedia Logic §48). 
This is Kant’s »critique of dialectical illusion«, called tran-
scendental dialectic, i.e., the advent of the synthetic a 
priori cognition. In contrast, Hegel states that the fi nitude 
of the determinations of the understanding does not lie in 
their subjectivity; on the contrary, they are fi nite in them-
selves. Therefore, their fi nitude should be exhibited in 
these determinations themselves. Kant believed that our 
thought are false just because we think it (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §60 addition 1). Here, Hegel proposes the idea that 
the genuine infi nite is not merely a realm beyond the fi -
nite, but contains the fi nite sublated within itself (Ency-
clopaedia Logic §45 addition). This is the starting point of 
Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel notices that antinomy is found 
not only in the four particular objects taken from cosmol-
ogy by Kant, but rather in all objects of all kinds, in all 
representations, concepts, and ideas. The true and positive 
signifi cance of the antinomies is that everything actual 
contains opposed determinations within it, and in conse-
quence the cognition and, more exactly, the comprehension 
of an object amounts precisely to our becoming conscious 
of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations (Ency-
clopaedia Logic §48 addition). Hegel’s task is to under-
stand this, and to be cognizant of this property of objects, 
which would constitute what will determine itself in due 
course as the dialectical moment of logical thinking (En-
cyclopaedia Logic §48). 
In Critical Philosophy, thinking is interpreted as being 
subjective, and its ultimate, unsurpassable determination 
is abstract universality, or formal identity. Thus, thinking 
is set in opposition to the truth, which is inwardly concrete 
universality. In this highest determination of thinking, 
which is reason, the categories are left out of account. 
From the opposing standpoint, thinking is interpreted as 
an activity of the particular, and in that way, it is declared 
to be incapable of grasping truth (Encyclopaedia Logic 
§61). Thinking as an activity of the particular has catego-
ries as its only product and content. However, Kant does 
not pay attention to the fact that these categories are re-
stricted determinations, forms of what is conditioned, de-
pendent, and mediated. Thought-determinations are 
called »concept«, and to »comprehend« an object means 
nothing more than to grasp it in the form of something 
conditioned and mediated. Inasmuch as it is what is true, 
infi nite, or unconditioned, it is transformed into some-
thing conditioned and mediated. Instead of truth being 
grasped in thinking, it is perverted into untruth in Kan-
tian philosophy, which therefore cannot make the passage 
to the infi nite (Encyclopaedia Logic §62). Hegel claims 
that being is what is true only as mediated by the Idea and 
conversely, that the Idea is what is true only as mediated 
by being. When we notice that one of the determinations 
has truth only through its mediation by the other, or, in 
other words, that each of them is mediated with the truth 
only through the other, since the determination of media-
tion is deemed to be contained in every immediacy, the 
unity of the Idea with being will be attained through the 
process of sublating itself in the mediation (Encyclopaedia 
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Logic §70, §75). The antithesis between an independent 
immediacy of the content or of knowing, and, on the other 
side, an equally independent mediation that is irreconcil-
able with it, must be put aside because it is a mere presup-
position and an arbitrary assurance. Also, all other pre-
suppositions or assumptions must equally must be given 
up (Encyclopaedia Logic §78), where Hegel’s dialectical 
moment (the speculative or positively rational moment) 
emerges. The dialectical moment is the self-sublation of 
the fi nite determinations on their own part, and their 
passing into their opposites (Encyclopaedia Logic §81). 
Hegel claims that the dialectic has a positive result, 
because it has a determinate content, or because its result 
is truly not empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of 
certain determinations, which are contained in the result 
precisely because it is not an immediate nothing, but a 
result (Encyclopaedia Logic §82). This rational result, al-
though it is something-thought and something-abstract, 
is at the same time something-concrete, because it is not 
simple, formal unity, but a unity of distinct determina-
tions. In the speculative Logic, the dialectical and the 
rational are omitted, resulting in a descriptive collection 
of determinations of thought put together in various ways, 
which in their fi nitude count for something infi nite (En-
cyclopaedia Logic §82). The most conspicuous feature of 
Hegel’s philosophy is that he claims to have made clear the 
speculative Logic, which is supposed to enable the fi nite 
and the infi nite to unite through the mediatory process of 
sublation, i.e., that the infi nite is the affi rmative, preserv-
ing itself as the fi nite, which is sublated. (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §95). Since Hegel is afraid that the expression »the 
fi nite and the infi nite are therefore One, that the True, or 
the genuine Infi nity, is determined and expressed as the 
unity of the infi nite and the fi nite« may be misleading, 
though the expression contains something correct, he em-
phasizes that the fi nite, when posited as one with the in-
fi nite, could surely not remain what it is outside of this 
unity, and would at the very least be somewhat affected 
in its determination, and the same would happen to the 
infi nite, which, as the negative, would, for its part, also be 
blunted upon the other (Encyclopaedia Logic §95). Thus, 
Hegel seems to have made an utmost effort to rescue rea-
son from being reduced to an empty identity with the use 
of logic different from Kant’s transcendental dialectic. 
Why does Hegel need »the speculative« in his discourse 
like Kant needs »the transcendental«? Hegel’s answer is 
that fi nitude is under the determination of reality at fi rst, 
while the truth of the fi nitude is rather its ideality. In the 
same way, the infi nite of the understanding, which is put 
beside the fi nite, is itself also only one of two fi nites: some-
thing-untrue or something-ideal (Encyclopaedia Logic 
§95). As regards to »the speculative«, Hegel explains that 
though apparently it looks mystical, when the abstract 
thinking of the understanding is regarded as synonymous 
with the speculative, the mystical becomes tantamount to 
the concrete unity of just those determinations that count 
as true for the understanding only in their separation and 
opposition. In this way, the abstract thinking of the un-
derstanding is a constant sublating of itself and an over-
turning into its opposite, whereas the rational as such is 
rational precisely because it contains both opposites as 
ideal moments within itself. Thus, everything rational can 
equally be called »mystical«; however, this only amounts 
to saying that it transcends the understanding (Encyclo-
paedia Logic §82 addition). 
Hegel states that subjective representing and thinking 
posits the antithesis between itself and the world, which 
is in-itself null and void for it as null and void (Encyclo-
paedia Logic §224). Here, Reason comes in, which would 
enable, through the process of cognition, the antithesis of 
the one-sidedness of the subjectivity together with the one-
sidedness of objectivity, to be implicitly sublated within 
One activity. Initially, this sublating happens only in-it-
self, then, it starts to fall apart into the doubled movement 
of sublating drive, posited as two diverse movements (En-
cyclopaedia Logic §225). One is the movement to sublate 
the one-sidedness of the subjectivity of the Idea by means 
of the assumption of the world into subjective representa-
tion and thought; and to fi ll the abstract certainty of one-
self with this objectivity as content. Then, the converse 
movement occurs, in which the one-sidedness of the objec-
tive world, which therefore counts only as a semblance, a 
collection of contingencies and of shapes which are in-
themselves null and void, is sublated, resulting in deter-
mining this world through the inwardness of the subjec-
tive, which here counts as what is truly objective and to 
»in-form« it with this subjectivity. The fi rst movement is 
the drive of knowledge toward truth, or cognition as such 
– the theoretical activity of the Idea – while the second is 
the drive of the good toward its own accomplishment – 
willing, the practical activity of the Idea (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §225). 
Here, human factors, such as life, come in. Hegel states 
that life is comprehensible as the Idea that exists as the 
Concept, the immediate Idea, which, however, expresses 
at once the defects of life as well. The defect consists in the 
fact that the Concept and reality still do not correspond 
with one another, since the concept of life is the soul, and 
this concept has the body for its reality (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §216 addition). In other words, the Concept is real-
ized in a body as the soul, which is the immediate self-
relating universality of the body’s externality and the 
particularizing of the body, and the singularity is realized 
as infi nite negativity (Encyclopaedia Logic §216). Accord-
ing to Hegel, the living individual is presupposed to be 
immediate, emerging as something-mediated and gener-
ated, but while conversely being a living singularity. The 
living singularity, which on account of its initial imme-
diacy stands in a negative relationship to universality, or 
the genus, goes under in this universality as what has 
power over singularity (Encyclopaedia Logic §221). The 
immediate living being mediates itself with itself in the 
process of the genus, and in this way, it elevates itself 
above its immediacy, but always just to sink back into it 
again. What is brought about through the process of life 
is the sublation and overcoming of the immediacy in 
which, as life, the Idea is still entangled (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §221 addition). If we agree with the argument that 
the objects are »true« when they are what they ought to be 
(Encyclopaedia Logic §213 addition), what is achieved as 
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truth is deemed good. Universality, having been posited 
fi rst as genus and also as the range of its various species 
as totality (Encyclopaedia Logic §177), is necessary for 
achieving what ought to be. The necessity, which fi nite 
cognition produces in its demonstration, is to begin with 
an external one, directed only at subjective insight. How-
ever, in necessity as such, fi nite cognition itself has aban-
doned its presupposition and starting point, the simple 
fi nding and givenness of its content, leading the subjective 
Idea to arrive at what is determinate in and for itself, not-
given, and hence immanent in the subject, resulting in its 
passing over into the Idea of willing (Encyclopaedia Logic 
§232). The subjective Idea, as what is in and for itself de-
terminate and as a content that is equal to itself and 
simple, is the good (Encyclopaedia Logic §233). The good, 
which aims rather to determine the world that it fi nds 
already there according to its own purpose (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §233), has the drive toward its own accomplishment 
as willing, the practical activity of the Idea (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §225) which exists freely for it-self inasmuch as the 
Idea has itself as its object (Encyclopaedia Logic §223). 
This will is concerned with fi nally making the world into 
what it ought to be (Encyclopaedia Logic §234 addition). 
As for the unity of the theoretical and the practical Idea, 
the Idea of life is united with the idea of cognition, which 
is the absolute Idea that is in and for itself (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §236). Thus, the truth of the good is posited eter-
nally as purpose (Encyclopaedia Logic §235). Here, skep-
ticism or irony starts to torment Hegel, who asserts that 
when the purpose is an infi nite one, we can neither expe-
rience nor see in the sphere of the fi nite that the purpose 
is genuinely attained. Hegel expressed the irony himself, 
stating »The accomplishing of the infi nite purpose consists 
therefore only in sublating the illusion that it has not yet 
been accomplished. The good, the absolute good, fulfi lls 
itself eternally in the world, and the result is that it is 
already fulfi lled in and for itself, and does not need to wait 
upon us for this to happen. This is the illusion in which 
we live, and at the same time it is this illusion alone that 
is the activating element upon which our interest in the 
world rests« (Encyclopaedia Logic §212 addition). 
Discussion
The philosophical discourse of Descartes, Kant and 
Hegel have been reviewed, focusing on the following: 1) 
how Descartes dealt with the issue of passions and the 
body, and how he explicated cogito, ergo sum and used this 
logic for fi nding the foundation of his moral conduct: 2) how 
Kant criticized Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum, and reached 
the transcendental dialectic as the foundation of his moral-
ity for the rational: 3) how Hegel criticized Kant’s proposi-
tion of the synthetic a priori cognition, and reached the 
speculative Logic as the foundation of his reorganizing 
worldview and the fabric of human society. Why should we 
start our critical review from Descartes? It is explicitly 
explained in the preface of The Passions of the Soul, which 
says »in your fi rst Essais, which contains hardly anything 
but the Dioptrique and the Météores, you’d already ex-
plained over six hundred problems in Philosophy which no 
one before you had been able to explain so well, and that 
even though many had looked askance at your writings 
and sought all sorts of means of refuting them, you never-
theless knew of no one who had yet been able to discover 
anything in them which wasn’t true. To this you add that 
if anyone wants to count one by one the problems which all 
the other ways of philosophizing that have been in vogue 
since the world began have been able to solve, he will per-
haps not fi nd that they are so numerous or so notable. You 
assert besides that no one has ever been able to fi nd the 
true solution of any problem through the principles pecu-
liar to the Philosophy attributed to Aristotle, which is the 
only one now taught in the Schools,…« (Passions Preface, 
First Letter). When we believe what was said in the pref-
ace, Descartes’ discourse seems to be a legitimate starting 
point of our critique. Clarifying how Descartes treated the 
sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity and the body 
is critically important for achieving our aim to present an 
alternative analysis of western philosophy and to clarify 
its implications on humans and society in modern times, 
since apparently Kant and Hegel accepted Descartes’ 
stance regarding the sensuous and emotional aspects of 
humanity and the body to be the basis of their discourse. 
In The Passions of the Soul, fi rst Descartes posited 
passions at the site near the body, insisting that since 
what is a passion in the soul is commonly an action in the 
body, there is no better path for arriving at an understand-
ing of our passions than to examine the difference between 
the soul and the body (Passions Article 2). Thus, introduc-
ing the concept of body-soul dualism, he insists that 
though the soul is truly joined to the whole body, the soul 
whose function consists of the actions of the soul, defi ned 
as thinking or volitions, and passions, defi ned as percep-
tions, sensations or excitations of the soul, should be dif-
ferentiated from the body, which seems to have an affi nity 
with the animal spirit and passions, while thinking seems 
to be coupled with reason, intellect and the understand-
ing. In the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes, 
who apparently had the discourse which was revealed in 
The Passions of the Soul in mind, came across the fi nding 
that the nature of man is composed of mind and body, ap-
preciating the value of a thought, the mind and reason as 
the foundation of his philosophical discourse while depre-
ciating the value of the body and senses. Upon the body-
soul dualism, which put senses and passions on the site 
near the body, Descartes expounded in the Discourse on 
the Method that he was nothing but a thinking thing after 
rejecting as absolutely false everything in which he could 
imagine the least doubt. Descartes, who believed to have 
found just one thing that was certain and unshaken, pro-
nounced »I think, therefore I am«, and declared that he 
would spend his whole life in order to advance, as far as 
he could, in the knowledge of truth following the command 
that he should never allow himself to be persuaded except 
by the evidence of his reason. However, a serious problem 
arises here. Since he, as a thinking »I«, seemed to lack 
substance, he needed something outside himself which 
could bestow the thinking »I« substance. Descartes came 
across the idea that since he who may not be perfect can 
think of something perfect which should have originated 
from something perfect outside of himself, i.e., God, his 
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thinking faculties, such as reason, intellect and the un-
derstanding, should be associated with what is perfect, 
i.e., God. Descartes asserted that as God is a perfect being, 
the source bestows substance to the thinking »I« which is 
capable of thinking of something perfect in spite of its be-
ing not perfect.
Following Descartes’ discourse of »I think, therefore I 
am (cogito, ergo sum)«, Kant explored a form of logic, 
which was expected to endow substance to the thinking 
»I” without the prop of »God« in the Critique of Pure Rea-
son. Kant stated that the proposition »I think«, which is 
an empirical one, did not mean that the »I« was an em-
pirical representation, indicating that Descartes’ »I think, 
therefore I am« may be an indeterminate empirical intu-
ition, i.e., a perception, in which the proposition »I think« 
contains within itself the proposition »I exist«, and the »I« 
seems to lack content. Kant asserted that sensation, which 
belongs to sensibility, cannot ground the existential prop-
osition (Pure Reason B422). In regard to the propping up 
of the thinking »I« by God, Kant criticized it as the confu-
sion of a logical predicate with a real one, saying »Any-
thing one likes can serve as a logical predicates, even the 
subject can be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from 
every content« (Pure Reason A598/B626). In place of »I 
think, therefore, I am«, which seems to lack content, Kant 
submitted the idea that every existential proposition is 
synthetic, i.e., with actuality, the object is not merely in 
our concept analytically, but adds synthetically to our con-
cept. Here the questions, such as whether Kant’s synthet-
ic a priori cognition succeeds in adding content or sub-
stance to the thinking »I« or not, and if it succeeds, what 
the evidence of its success would be, will arise. However, 
Kant’s answer to these questions remains equivocal. Ac-
cording to Hegel, Kantian philosophy, which examines the 
validity of the concepts of the understanding or the 
thought-determinations according to the antithesis of sub-
jectivity and objectivity, extends it in such a way that ex-
perience in its entirety falls within subjectivity. Therefore, 
nothing remains in contrast to subjectivity except the 
thing-in-itself. The Kantian categories which are mani-
fold, the representations with a tinge of content which may 
be accrued through the intercourse with time and space, 
themselves a priori, seem unfi t to be the determinations 
of the infi nite which is not given in perception. Accord-
ingly, the unconditioned or infi nite is nothing but the self-
equivalent, original identity of the thinking »I«, or the 
abstract »I« itself which seems empty. In an attempt to 
overcome this predicament, Hegel, who machinated to 
shift the defects from the faculty of thinking and percep-
tion to the object itself, made a proposition that the genu-
ine infi nite is not merely a realm beyond the fi nite, but 
which contains the fi nite sublated within itself. Since the 
infi nite results from the negation of certain-determina-
tions, i.e., the fi nite, it may not be empty, not be an im-
mediate nothing, but have a determinate content (sub-
stance). Hegel expounded that being is the Concept only 
in-itself; its determinations are; in their distinction they 
are others vis-à-vis each other, and their further determi-
nation is a passing-over into another. This process is both 
a setting-forth and an unfolding, of the Concept that is 
in-itself, and at the same time the going-into-itself of be-
ing. The explication of the Concept in the sphere of Being 
becomes the totality of being, just as the immediacy of 
being is sublated by it (Encyclopaedia Logic §84). Does 
this speculative Logic bestow content to the thinking »I«, 
succeeding in rescuing reason from being reduced to the 
empty identity? Hegel’s own answer is that a constant sub-
lating of itself and overturning into its opposite is the ab-
stract thinking of the understanding, and thus becomes 
speculative and rational, while appearing mystical be-
cause it transcends the understanding. Hegel’s speculative 
Logic seems equivocal regarding its potential of enabling 
the unconditioned or infi nite, i.e., the original identity of 
the thinking »I«, or the abstract »I« to attain content or 
substance. 
Here, a question of why skepticism is not entirely 
erased from the discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel 
in regard to the identity of the thinking »I«, which they 
explained has content or substance, arises. No one seems 
to have tried to fi nd an explicit answer to this question so 
far. It has been shown that Descartes restricted the foun-
dation of his moral conduct within the knowledge of truth 
that reason allows him to be persuaded. Reason, operating 
within the thinking »I«, is the rational aspect of human-
ity, composed of an intelligent nature, which is supposed 
to be unaffected by corporeal nature such as sensation and 
emotion. And the principal line of this idea has been ac-
cepted by Kant and Hegel, who apparently made their 
philosophical discourse on the basis of the intellectual na-
ture of humans such as reason, the thinking »I«, the ra-
tional, and the understanding. Kant betrayed himself as 
to why he dealt with only the rational aspect of humanity, 
composed of an intelligent nature, admitting »the mere 
analysis of the concepts that inhabit our reason a priori, 
is not the end at all, but only a preparation for metaphys-
ics proper, namely extending its a priori cognition syn-
thetically, and it is useless for this end, because it merely 
shows what is contained in these concepts, but not how we 
attain such concepts a priori in order thereafter to be able 
to determine their valid use in regard to the objects of all 
cognition in general« (Pure Reason B23, B24). Kant stat-
ed that the supreme principles of morality and the funda-
mental concepts of it are the synthetic a priori cognition, 
into which no concept that contains anything empirical 
must enter, which is tantamount to the transcendental 
dialectic, i.e., philosophy of pure, speculative reason (Pure 
Reason A14/B28, A15, B29), while the applied logic, a rep-
resentation of the understanding and the rules of its nec-
essary use in concreto, is related to the doctrine of virtue 
proper which assesses these laws under the hindrances of 
the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which human 
beings are more or less subject. In the similar context, 
Hegel had to deal with only the rational aspect of human-
ity, composed of an intelligent nature, because he was 
thinking about the distinction of the purpose, called a 
concept-of-reason, as the fi nal cause from the mere effi -
cient cause (Encyclopaedia Logic §204). The purpose re-
quires a speculative interpretation, as the Concept which 
itself contains the judgment or negation, i.e., the antithesis 
of the subjective and objective – and which is just as much 
their sublation (Encyclopaedia Logic §204). Here, Hegel’s 
teleology emerges as the fi nal cause. Hegel conceded that 
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his philosophy was on the lines of those of Descartes and 
Kant, admitting »Speculative Logic contains the older 
logic and metaphysics; it preserves the same forms of 
thought, laws, and object, but it develops and transforms 
them with further categories« (Encyclopaedia Logic §9). 
Thus, it becomes clear that Descartes, Kant and Hegel 
have no choice other than to deal with only the rational 
aspect of humanity, composed of an intelligent nature, in 
their discourse: their moral law and ethics command them 
to face with it. 
What kind of moral law Descartes, Kant and Hegel had 
in mind when they launched to make philosophical dis-
course is critically important, and it is waiting to be clar-
ifi ed. This was Kant’s answer: his aim was to work out for 
once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of ev-
erything that may be only empirical and that belonged to 
anthropology (Groundwork 4:389). This discourse made 
so far, in conjunction with Kant’s saying, enables the as-
sumption that Kant’s moral law, which is supposed to have 
nothing to do with the laws cognized in anthropology, is 
antithetical to the ethical value system of Homeric epics, 
which consists of six concepts: »oath«, »honor«, »guest«, 
»blood«, »ood«, and »revenge«1, which apparently belongs 
to anthropology. The fact that Hegel appreciated Kantian 
practical reason was expressed in his statement: »The free 
self-determination that Kant denied to theoretical reason, 
he expressly vindicated for practical reason. It is this as-
pect of the Kantian philosophy especially that has won 
great favor for it, and that is, of course, perfectly justifi ed« 
(Encyclopaedia Logic §54 addition). This suggests that 
Hegel’s moral law of practical reason was on the lines of 
Kantian moral law, though Hegel’s speculative Logic is 
different from Kant’s transcendental dialectic. Thus, it 
becomes clear that it is the moral law and ethics which are 
antithetical to the ethical value system of Homeric epics 
that incessantly call Descartes, Kant and Hegel to focus 
on reason and the rational aspect of humanity, composed 
of an intelligent nature, while deleting the sensuous and 
emotional aspects of humanity and the bodily factors as-
sociated with them. When they started their discourse 
with the presupposition of the thinking »I« and with delet-
ing the sensuous and emotional aspects of humanity, the 
end result was that thinking is always interpreted as be-
ing subjective, and cannot reach its ultimate, unsurpass-
able determination, which is abstract and infi nite. There-
fore, thinking is set in opposition to the truth, which is 
inwardly concrete universality (Encyclopaedia Logic §61). 
However, no one seems to be able to erase the doubt that 
this thinking »I« may be empty and void. Kant expressed 
his own doubt, saying »it is very enticing and seductive to 
make use of these pure cognitions of the understanding 
and principles by themselves, and even beyond all bounds 
of experience, which however itself alone can give us the 
matter (objects) to which those pure concepts of the under-
standing can be applied, the understanding falls into the 
danger of making a material use of the mere formal prin-
ciples of pure understanding through empty sophistries« 
(Pure Reason A63, B88). In an attempt to fi ll the void by 
bestowing content or substance to the thinking »I«, Des-
cartes brought up God, Kant the transcendental dialectic 
and fi nally, Hegel brought up the speculative Logic. Did 
they succeed in fi lling the void? Could Kant’s transcenden-
tal idealism really thwart his critical remark on Plato, 
which refers to the fact that Plato abandoned the world of 
the senses because it set such narrow limits for the under-
standing, and dare to go beyond it on the wings of the 
ideals, in the empty space of pure understanding (Pure 
Reason B9), to return to himself? Kant might have ut-
tered his verdict in advance, saying »The light dove, in free 
fl ight cutting through the air the resistance of which it 
feels, could get the idea that it could do even better in air-
less space« (Pure Reason A5, B9). Does Descartes’ God or 
Kant’s transcendental dialectic or Hegel’s speculative 
Logic prevent the light dove from thinking to fl y in airless 
space? No, it is not the logic, but the moral law and ethics 
that are expected to do it. According to Kant, since all 
moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a 
priori in reason, moral law is to hold for every rational 
beings as such, to derive them from the universal concept 
of rational being as such, and in this way set forth com-
pletely the whole of morals, which needs anthropology for 
its application to human beings (Groundwork 4:411-412). 
When moral law and ethics as what Descartes, Kant and 
Hegel cherished are assumed to constitute the whole of 
morals from anthropology, they are deemed to represent 
universality of the principle of humanity, i.e., the truth 
which is inwardly concrete universality. This universality 
is expected to give content to their discourse. Kant might 
have expressed his expectation in his saying that proceed-
ing analytically from common cognition to the determina-
tion of its supreme principle in turn proceeds from the 
examination of this principle and its source to the common 
cognition (Groundwork 4:392). Hegel also expressed it in 
his saying that a content has its justifi cation only as a 
moment to the whole, outside of which it is only an un-
founded presupposition or a subjective certainty (Encyclo-
paedia Logic §14). Since their moral law and ethics have 
been assumed to be the only ones that humans have had, 
the »sole« ones are seen to be propping up their discourse 
as the universality and »the whole«. 
In contrast to the moral law and ethics, which Des-
cartes, Kant and Hegel seem to have in mind, the ethical 
value system of a society without state power, as repre-
sented by the Albanian customary code, the Kanun20, is 
supposed to serve well for creating a sense of justice, peace 
and order in society if it has social and cultural conditions 
as follows: 1) there is no functioning state power; 2) the 
kinship system is of great importance; 3) the kin group is 
a transcendental commune consisting of the living and the 
dead; 4) the kin group has the obligation to keep its exis-
tence in the community; 5) animism and ancestor worship 
are prevalent; 6) the ethos of warriors is highly regarded; 
7) spoken words are appreciated more than written words; 
8) the population of the area where the Kanun operates is 
not crowded so that the segmentary, acephalous lineage 
society is neatly preserved. A sense of justice is the indis-
pensable element for human society to preserve its lasting 
and peaceful existence on Earth, without which it is im-
possible to guard peace and order based on humanity1. A 
society without state power has been found to have moral-
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ity and logic of its own, which have spontaneously devel-
oped on the basis of pagan religions. The disciplinary force 
in a society without state power is the retributive action 
by the offended party on the offending party1. This action 
is regarded as legal only when it is carried out by the of-
fended party in the outburst of ethical resentment. The 
ethical structure of the Kanun incorporates the urge for 
action of the offended party, which is arising from their 
(rational) thinking coupled with sensation and emotion, 
into the ethical value system, converting the retributive 
action into a sacred force, supposedly wielded by the gods. 
In a society without state power, such as ancient societies, 
archaic societies and tribal societies, the retributive action 
of the offended party is the ultimate sanction, engendering 
a sense of justice among people in that society. It is a self-
perpetuating ethical value system, which is logically 
equivalent, as well as antithetical to, that of a society with 
state power, which does not accept the retributive action 
of the offended party as a due sanction1. Previously, we 
found in the ethical structure of the Kanun the three pil-
lars: the concept of a consanguine commune, the concept 
of continuity and growth of the consanguine commune, 
and the concept of fi lial piety and loyalty to the consan-
guine commune1. Through a comparative study between 
the ethical structure of the Kanun and the value system 
of ultra-nationalism in prewar Japan, we elaborated on its 
structure as follows: 1) the consanguine commune: indi-
viduals in the society belong to their consanguine com-
mune, which has its own ancestor. If they ascend their 
family tree, the family tree would merge into the divine 
obscurity of the Universe. In the ritual, they accept their 
ancestor as a guest-god and offer the guest-god food and 
hospitality. The guest-god utters blessings in return for 
the hospitality, which ensures their divinity and the pros-
perity of the consanguine commune; 2) the continuity and 
growth of the consanguine commune: the consanguine 
commune is an ethical commune because it is the com-
mune which has originated from the divine obscurity of 
the Universe. At the same time, it is the transcendental 
commune which comprises the dead, the living, and those 
yet to be born. The ethical and transcendental commune, 
originating from and comprised of the divine world, has 
the obligation to continue to exist in the world forever. The 
extinction of this consanguine commune is the highest 
violation of the divine law, tantamount to the denial of the 
ethics and the order of the Universe; 3) fi lial piety and 
loyalty: when the consanguine commune is in peril, its 
members are to stand up for its defense. If the consan-
guine commune has insoluble confl icts with another com-
mune, it could thus annihilate the obstructing commune 
in order to secure its existence. Any act defending or im-
proving the consanguine commune is ethical, while any 
act damaging or negating it is unethical. Its members 
swear an oath that they would remain loyal to the com-
mune. If any member breaks the oath, he is to be expelled 
from the commune. The soul of the member who remains 
loyal and dies in the battle for the commune could go to 
Heaven where it would mingle with the dead ancestors 
who are worshiped as gods, and soothed by the rituals 
performed by the commune1,21. 
Hegel criticized Empiricism, saying »From Empiricism 
the call went out: »Stop chasing about empty abstractions, 
look at what is there for the taking, grasp the here and 
now, human and natural, as it is here before us and enjoy 
it!« And there is no denying that this contains an essen-
tially justifi ed moment. This world, the here and now, the 
present, was to be substituted for the empty Beyond, for 
the spiderwebs and cloudy shapes of the abstract under-
standing. That is precisely how the fi rm footing, i.e., the 
infi nite determination that was missing in the older meta-
physics was gained. The understanding only picks out fi -
nite determinations; these by themselves are shaky and 
without footing, and the building erected on them collapse 
upon itself. To fi nd an infi nite determination was always 
the impulse of reason,…this drive took hold of the present, 
the »Here«, the »This«, which has infi nite form in it, even 
though this form does not have its genuine existence« (En-
cyclopaedia Logic §38 addition). Is Hegel’s discourse that 
the »Here«, the »This«, the here and now, the present are 
only the infi nite form without content or substance (genu-
ine existence) true? Here, we will posit the ethical struc-
ture of the Kanun to Hegel’s discourse. In a world where 
the ethical value system of a society without state power 
prevails, the thinking »I« is coupled with sensation, emo-
tion and the body, and is the fi nite (if we borrow Hegel’s 
word, »it«, which originally seems infi nite, is made fi nite 
through the fi nite form of the understanding). This world, 
the here and now, the present, which are considered to be 
the infi nite determination as a form, are picked up by the 
thinking »I« coupled with sensation, emotion and the body, 
through perception and the understanding. In contrast to 
the infi nite determination of Empiricism as well as to that 
of Descartes, Kant and Hegel, this infi nite determination, 
which apparently seems merely a form, is associated with 
content or substance, because this thinking »I« coupled 
with sensation, emotion and the body represents a link 
which connects to both infi nity, i.e., the divine obscurity 
of the Universe bygone and infi nity, i.e., the divine obscu-
rity of the Universe that is to come. This link as »I« is a 
representation given through feeling and intuition, which 
is manifold with regard to its content, and which also con-
tains time and space that are a priori as forms of intuiting. 
The thinking »I« coupled with sensation, emotion and the 
body is not void or empty, but is fi lled with content or 
substance, while the thinking »I« without the sensuous 
and emotional aspects of humanity looks always void and 
empty. In this context, the verdict is that God, transcen-
dental dialectic and speculative Logic are destined to fail 
in fi lling the emptiness of the thinking »I«, because it is 
originally empty as a result of its original defects. When 
something is added to nothing, nothing does not breed 
anything more than the something that is added. This is 
the disaster which western philosophers from Plato to 
Descartes, Kant and Hegel have failed to fi x. It is the 
aporia, which Kant might have already implied: »it is a 
presupposition that we cannot justify through anything« 
(Pure Reason A601/B629). The discourse of western phi-
losophers such as Descartes, Kant and Hegel looks bril-
liant provided the presupposition that there is only one 
type of ethical value system in human society is justifi ed. 
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Only under this condition, do their moral law and ethics 
keep projecting a bright light onto their discourse as uni-
versality and necessity. Kant seems to have fi rmly be-
lieved that humans should not have had moral laws other 
than what he regarded to be the moral law, of which ap-
parent universality might have given content to his dis-
course. Hegel asserted that his philosophical encyclopae-
dia would not deal with philosophy, which is positive, 
though it contained a rational component. He stated »what 
is positive in the sciences is of diverse kinds:… The phi-
losophy that wants to base itself on anthropology, on facts 
of consciousness, on inward intuition or outward experi-
ence, belongs here too« (Encyclopaedia Logic §16). It is 
unfortunate that no one, except the people who have been 
in the world where a state power does not exist or does not 
function appropriately, has noticed an alternative tran-
scendental dialectic or an alternative speculative Logic, 
i.e., the ethical value system of a society without state 
power. When alternative ethical value system, which 
seems universal in a society without state power, is made 
manifest1, the discourse of Descartes, Kant and Hegel 
seems to have lost some luster because their ethical value 
system which is fi rmly believed to be the only one that 
humans could have had, receded on account of positing 
alternative ethical value system and resulting in the rela-
tivism of ethics. However, Hegel seemed to have given his 
verdict on this kind of discourse in advance, claiming 
»Who is not smart enough to be able to see around him 
quite a lot that is not, in fact, how it ought to be? But this 
smartness is wrong when it has the illusion that, in its 
dealings with ob-jects of this kind and with their »ought«, 
it is operating within the concerns of philosophical science. 
This science deals only with the Idea – which is not so 
impotent that it merely ought to be, and is not actual – and 
further with an actuality of which those ob-jects, institu-
tions, and situations are only the superfi cial outer rind« 
(Encyclopaedia Logic §6). Was it really possible for Hegel 
to see around him how it ought to be, like the ethical struc-
ture of the Kanun? No, he could not or would not see it 
because of his cultural background, which a priori de-
clines to acknowledge the presence of alternative ethical 
value system.
This is an appropriate juncture in this discourse, in 
which we will make a proposition explicitly that there 
have been two types of ethical value systems among hu-
mans: one which is antithetical to the ethical structure of 
the Kanun, which began emerging in the fi fth century 
B.C., and that of the Kanun, which began emerging in the 
obscurity of the remotest past. The history of western phi-
losophy, which spans more than two thousand years, is 
supposed to be one of struggle between the ethical struc-
ture of the Kanun and the forces trying to destroy it1. This 
struggle between the ethical structure of the Kanun and 
western philosophy, which began in the fi fth century B.C. 
in the ancient Greek world1,6, culminated in the discourse 
of Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Kant, who seems to have 
intuitively discerned the possibility of the alternative 
transcendental dialectic when he made his arduous cri-
tique of pure reason, says »human reason, without being 
moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, inexorably 
pushes on, driving by its own need to such questions that 
cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason and 
of principles borrowed from such a use; and thus a certain 
sort of metaphysics has actually been present in all human 
beings as soon as reason has extended itself to speculation 
in them, and it will also always remain there. And now 
about this too the question is: How is metaphysics as a 
natural predisposition possible?« (Pure Reason B21, B22). 
Have humans been capable of having metaphysics as a 
natural predisposition? If so, what sort of metaphysics is 
the metaphysica naturalis? Has it arisen from the nature 
of universal human reason? Kant confessed that unavoid-
able contradictions have always been found in all previous 
attempts to answer these natural questions (Pure Reason 
B22). Here, we attempt to make an alternative answer to 
these questions. According to Hegel, the human being dis-
tinguishes itself from the animals by thinking: if so, then 
everything human is human because it is brought about 
through thinking, and for that reason alone (Encyclopaedia 
Logic §2). When humans appeared on this planet as hu-
man, they should have had »thought« and »reason« already. 
It can be safely assumed that humans had a metaphysica 
naturalis and ethics which have spontaneously developed 
on the basis of a pagan religion from the early stage of 
prehistoric times. It is impossible to assume that humans 
have had only one type of ethical value system which is 
antithetical to the ethical structure of the Kanun from the 
early stage of prehistoric times for at least two reasons. 
One reason is that ethical value system began to drasti-
cally change in the fi fth and fourth centuries B.C. when 
Gotama preached a new religious doctrine on the Indian 
continent, and Socrates and Plato developed the dialectic 
of the Idea of Good in the ancient Greek world5,6. The meta-
physica naturalis and ethics which humans have had un-
til the fi fth century B.C. should be assumed to be the 
ethical value system of a society without state power, 
which had been functioning in human society from time 
immemorial. The second is that the metaphysics which 
Descartes, Kant and Hegel had in mind is associated with 
the ethical value system which is antithetical to that of a 
society without state power. It was impossible for this type 
of metaphysics to exist among human society throughout 
their whole history, or even if it existed from the early 
stage of their presence on this planet, it could not be viable 
at least before civilization appeared in human society, 
around 3000 B.C., when an incipient state power is be-
lieved to have emerged1,5. The unavoidable contradictions 
in all previous attempts to answer the natural questions 
which Kant raised would disappear when we acknowledge 
that two types of metaphysics have posited side by side 
with a parallel value among humans for more than two 
thousand years. Which type of metaphysics is more natu-
ral? The answer is obvious. The metaphysica naturalis 
associated with the ethical value system of a society with-
out state power is deemed to be more natural because it 
spontaneously developed on the basis of the pagan religion 
in prehistoric times5, and seems to have been lasting for 
tens of thousands of years. What is the evidence that en-
ables us to say that it had emerged tens of thousands of 
years ago? It comes from the literature of ancient and me-
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dieval times, as well as from the results of anthropological 
research carried out in the twentieth century, which show 
that the ethical value system of a society without state 
power has survived in various parts of the world from 
antiquity until modern times. This ethical value system 
has a structure, which is the same as or similar to that of 
the Kanun, consisting of six concepts: »oath«, »honor«, 
»guest«, »blood«, »food«, and »revenge«1,5. 
It has been assumed that modern humans (Homo sa-
piens) originated in Africa between 150,000 and 200,000 
years ago, and dispersed to Eurasia sometime after 65,000 
years ago, resulting in their further expansion all over the 
world, including Australia, North and South America2–4. 
Two hypotheses regarding the emergence of anatomically 
modern humans have been proposed: the multi-regional 
hypothesis, which states that the transformation of ar-
chaic to anatomically modern humans occurred in paral-
lel in different parts of the Old World, and the Africa ori-
gin hypothesis, which states that anatomically modern 
humans originated in Africa 100,000–200,000 years ago3. 
Currently, the latter is believed to be the case. As was 
indicated before, the ethical value system of a society with-
out state power, as represented by the ethical structure of 
the Kanun, is assumed to be the fi rst form of ethics that 
humans have ever had1. People who are or were in such 
various parts of the world, such as Australia22, North 
America22,23, the Arctic Circle22, the Middle East24–26, Cen-
tral Asia27, the Southern Pacifi c region22,28,29, Southeast-
ern Asia22,30, Transcaucasia31,32, the Mediterranean 
area33,34, and Africa35,36 have been found to have the ethical 
value system, which is similar to or the same as the ethi-
cal structure of the Kanun1,5. Here, we propose another 
hypothesis that humans who had been living in a small 
region in Africa came across a cultural apparatus, such 
as »guest« and »food«, through their primordial, crucial 
experiences, which enabled them to establish a friendly 
relationship between people issuing from different back-
grounds1,7 tens of thousands of years ago, before their dis-
persal to a wide area. This is the starting point from 
which humans fully developed the ethical value system of 
a society without state power, which would be the guaran-
tor, enabling people to keep order and peace in the society. 
People who founded the system prospered, multiplied, and 
spread all over the world, being accompanied by this cul-
tural apparatus. The ethical value system of a society 
without state power has such a fi nely tuned structure and 
versatility for solving any problems occurring in that so-
ciety that it seems diffi cult to assume that it appeared tens 
of thousands of years ago in parallel at multiple regions. 
Human beings are not human beings if it were not for 
ethics among them, which is the basic trait of humanity. 
In this sense, it can be said that anatomically modern 
humans truly became human beings when they acquired 
the ethical value system of a society without state power. 
It is time to conclude this discourse. Hegel explicated 
his logic tersely, saying »Within Being the abstract form 
of the progression is an other and passing-over into an 
other; within Essence it is shining within what is opposed; 
in the Concept it is the distinctness of the singular from 
the universality which continues itself as such into what 
is distinct from it, and is present as identity with the lat-
ter« (Encyclopaedia Logic §240). If we proceed our dis-
course with the use of this idea, it is concluded that the 
ethical value system of a society without state power and 
»an other« which is antithetical to the ethical structure of 
the Kanun should oppositely posit each other and recipro-
cally pass-over into another, thus sublating through the 
infi nite progress, and the result would be preserved as 
universality. Whether it is possible for the two ethical 
value systems to sublate, achieving the status of univer-
sality, i.e., One Totality, remains to be seen. 
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ALTERNATIVNA ANALIZA DISKURSA DESCARTESA, KANTA I HEGELA U SMISLU ETIČKOG 
USTROJSTVA KANUNA
S A Ž E T A K
Etička struktura albanskog običajnog kodeksa, Kanun, smatra se da predstavljaja etički vrijednosni sustav društva 
bez državne vlasti. Unatoč izgledu civilizacija i posljedične pojave jedne početnoe državne vlasti, ljudi kao da su poznava-
li samo etički sustav vrijednosti društva, bez državne vlasti sve dok su Gotama, Sokrat, Platon i Isus predložili nove 
religijske i fi lozofske doktrine. Osnovna značajka tih vjerskih i fi lozofskih doktrina, koje pokušavaju antagonizirati etički 
sustav vrijednosti u društvu bez državne vlasti, eliminira emocionalni aspekt čovječanstva od etičkog sustava vrijed-
nosti, naslijeđena je od strane zapadnih fi lozofa poput Descartesa, Kanta i Hegela. Pregledani su diskursi Descartesa, 
Kanta i Hegela su, dok je pozornost na to kako su se bavili senzualnim i emocionalnim aspektima čovječanstva. 
Metafi zičkie implikacije etičke strukture Kanuna isplivale su kritičkim preispitivanjem njihove fi lozofi je i predstavljen 
je hipoteza u vezi njegovog porijekla.
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